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Abstract
A vector matrix game with more than two skew symmetric matrices, which is an
extension of the matrix game, is deﬁned and the symmetric dual problem for a
nonlinear vector optimization problem is considered. Using the Kakutani ﬁxed point
theorem, we prove an existence theorem for a vector matrix game. We establish
equivalent relations between the symmetric dual problem and its related vector
matrix game. Moreover, we give an example illustrating the equivalent relations.
1 Introduction
A matrix game is deﬁned by B of a real m × n matrix together with the Cartesian prod-
uct Sn × Sm of all n-dimensional probability vectors Sn and allm-dimensional probability
vectors Sm; that is, Sn := {x = (x, . . . ,xn)T ∈ Rn : xi  ,∑ni= xi = }, where the symbol T
denotes the transpose. A point (x¯, y¯) ∈ Sn × Sn is called an equilibrium point of a matrix
game B if xTBy¯ x¯TBy¯ x¯TBy for all x, y ∈ Sn and x¯By¯ = v, where v is value of the game. If
n =m and B is skew symmetric, then we can check that (x¯, y¯) ∈ Sn × Sn is an equilibrium
point of the game B if and only if Bx¯  and By¯ . When B is an n× n skew symmetric
matrix, x¯ ∈ Sn is called a solution of the matrix game B if Bx¯  [].
Consider the linear programming problem (LP) and its dual (LD) as follows:
(LP) Minimize cTx subject to Ax b, x ,
(LD) Maximize bTy subject to ATy c, y ,
where c ∈Rn, x ∈Rn, b ∈Rm, y ∈Rm, A = [aij] is anm× n real matrix.
Now consider the matrix game associated with the following (n +m + ) × (n +m + )









Dantzig [] gave the complete equivalence between the linear programming duality and
the matrix game B. Many authors [–] have extended the equivalence results of Dantzig
[] to several kinds of scalar optimization problems. Very recently, Hong and Kim [] de-
ﬁned a vector matrix game and generalized the equivalence results of Dantzig [] to a
vector optimization problem by using the vector matrix game.
Recently, Kim and Noh [] established equivalent relations between a certain matrix
game and symmetric dual problems. Symmetric duality in nonlinear programming, in
© 2012 Hong et al.; licensee Springer. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribu-
tion License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any
medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
Hong et al. Fixed Point Theory and Applications 2012, 2012:233 Page 2 of 8
http://www.ﬁxedpointtheoryandapplications.com/content/2012/1/233
which the dual of the dual is the primal, was ﬁrst introduced by Dorn []. Dantzig, Eisen-
berg and Cottle [] formulated a pair of symmetric dual nonlinear problems and estab-
lished duality results for convex and concave functions with non-negative orthant as the
cone.Mond andWeir [] presented two pairs of symmetric dual vector optimization prob-
lems and obtained symmetric duality results concerning pseudoconvex and pseudocon-
cave functions.
In this paper, a vectormatrix gamewithmore than two skew symmetric matrices, which
is an extension of thematrix game, is deﬁned and a nonlinear vector optimization problem
is considered.We formulate a symmetric dual problem for the nonlinear vector optimiza-
tion problem and establish equivalent relations between the symmetric dual problem and
the corresponding vector matrix game. Moreover, we give a numerical example for show-
ing such equivalent relations.
2 Vector matrix game and existence theorem
Throughout this paper, we will denote the relative interior of Sp by
o
S p, and we will use the
following conventions for vectors in the Euclidean spaceRn for vectors x := (x, . . . ,xn) and
y := (y, . . . , yn):
x y if and only if xi  yi, i = , . . . ,n;
x < y if and only if xi < yi, i = , . . . ,n;
x≤ y if and only if xi  yi, and x = y; and
x y is the negation of x≤ y.
Consider the nonlinear programming problem (VOP):
(VOP) Minimize f (x) := (f(x), . . . , fp(x))
subject to x ∈ X ,
where X = {x ∈ Rn : g(x) b,x }, f : Rn → Rp, g : Rn → Rm are continuously diﬀeren-
tiable. The gradient ∇f (x) is an n× pmatrix, and ∇g(x) is an n×mmatrix.
Deﬁnition . [] A point x¯ ∈ X is said to be an eﬃcient solution for (VOP) if there exists
no other feasible point x ∈ X such that (f(x), . . . , fp(x))≤ (f(x¯), . . . , fp(x¯)).
Now, we deﬁne solutions for a vector matrix game as follows.
Deﬁnition . [] Let Bi, i = , . . . ,p, be real n × n skew-symmetric matrices. A point
x¯ ∈ Sn is said to be a vector solution of the vector matrix game Bi, i = , . . . ,p if
(x¯TBx, . . . , x¯TBpx) (x¯TBx¯, . . . , x¯TBpx¯) (xTBx¯, . . . ,xTBpx¯) for any x ∈ Sn.
We proved the characterization of a vector solution of the vector matrix game in [].
Lemma . [] Let Bi, i = , . . . ,p, be an n × n skew symmetric matrix. Then y¯ ∈ Sn is a






Hong et al. Fixed Point Theory and Applications 2012, 2012:233 Page 3 of 8
http://www.ﬁxedpointtheoryandapplications.com/content/2012/1/233
Remark . Let Bi, i = , . . . ,p, be an n× n skew symmetric matrix. From Lemma ., we
can obtain the following remark saying that the vector matrix game can be solved by ﬁxed
point problems; y¯ ∈ Sn is a vector solution of the vector matrix game Bi, i = , . . . ,p, if and
only if there exists ξ ∈ oS p such that y¯ ∈ Fξ (y¯), where Fξ (x) = {y ∈ Sn | y ∈ x – (∑pi= ξiBi)x –
Rn+}.
Noticing Remark ., we can obtain an existence theorem for the vector matrix game.
Theorem . Let Bi, i = , . . . ,p, be an n × n skew symmetric matrix. Then there exists a
vector solution of the vector matrix game Bi, i = , . . . ,p.












Then the multifunction Fξ is closed and hence upper semi-continuous, and so it follows
from the well-known Kakutani ﬁxed point theorem [] that the multifunction Fξ has a
ﬁxed point. So, by Remark ., there exists a vector solution of the vector matrix game Bi,
i = , . . . ,p. 
3 Equivalence relations
Now, we consider the nonlinear symmetric programming problem (SP) together with its
dual (SD) as follows:
(SP) Minimize (f(x, y) – yT∇y(λT f )(x, y), . . . , fp(x, y) – yT∇y(λT f )(x, y))
subject to –∇y(λT f )(x, y) ,
x , λ > ,
(SD) Maximize (f(u, v) – uT∇u(λT f )(u, v), . . . , fp(u, v) – uT∇u(λT f )(u, v))
subject to –∇u(λT f )(u, v) ,
v , λ > ,
where f := (f, . . . , fp) :Rn ×Rm →Rp are continuously diﬀerentiable.
Consider the vector matrix game deﬁned by the following (n+m+ )× (n+m+ ) skew




 –x∇yfi(x, y)T –∇xfi(x, y)
∇yfi(x, y)xT  ∇yfi(x, y)
∇xfi(x, y)T –∇yfi(x, y)T 
⎤
⎥⎦ .
Now, we give equivalent relations between (SD) and the vector matrix game Bi(x, y),
i = , . . . ,p.
Theorem. Let (x¯, y¯, ξ¯ ) be feasible for (SP) and (SD),with y¯T∇y(ξ¯T f )(x¯, y¯) = x¯T∇x(ξ¯T f )×




j y¯j), x* = z*x¯ and y* = z*y¯. Then (x*, y*, z*) is a vector
solution of the vector matrix game Bi(x¯, y¯), i = , . . . ,p.
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(x¯, y¯) = , (.)
x¯ , y¯ , ξ¯ ∈ oS p. (.)









(x¯, y¯) . (.)









(x¯, y¯) . (.)









(x¯, y¯)T y¯ = . (.)



























(x¯, y¯)Ty* = , (.)
x*  , y*  , z* > .










By Lemma ., (x*, y*, z*) is a vector solution of the vector matrix game Bi(x¯, y¯), i = , . . . ,p.

Theorem . Let (x*, y*, z*) with z* >  be a vector solution of the vector matrix game
Bi(x¯, y¯), i = , . . . ,p, where x¯ = x*/z* and y¯ = y*/z*. Then there exists ξ¯ ∈
o
S p such that (x¯, y¯, ξ¯ )
is feasible for (SP) and (SD), and y¯T∇y(ξ¯T f )(x¯, y¯) = x¯T∇x(ξ¯T f )(x¯, y¯) = .Moreover, if fi(·, y),
i = , . . . ,p, are convex for ﬁxed y and fi(x, ·), i = , . . . ,p, are concave for ﬁxed x, then (x¯, y¯)
is eﬃcient for (SP) with ﬁxed ξ¯ and (x¯, y¯) is eﬃcient for (SD) with ﬁxed ξ¯ .
Proof Let (x*, y*, z*) with z* >  be a vector solution of the vector matrix game Bi(x¯, y¯),







































(x¯, y¯)Ty*  , (.)
x*  , y*  , z* > . (.)



























(x¯, y¯)T y¯ . (.)
From (.),
x¯ , y¯ . (.)





(x¯, y¯) . (.)
From (.), –x¯∇y(ξ¯T f )(x¯, y¯)T y¯  ∇x(ξ¯T f )(x¯, y¯). Using (.) and (.), we obtain  
–x¯∇y(ξ¯T f )(x¯, y¯)T y¯  ∇x(ξ¯T f )(x¯, y¯). It implies that –∇x(ξ¯T f )(x¯, y¯)  . From (.),
x¯T∇x(ξ¯T f )(x¯, y¯) y¯T∇y(ξ¯T f )(x¯, y¯). But since x¯  and∇x(ξ¯T f )(x¯, y¯) , x¯T∇x(ξ¯T f )(x¯, y¯)










Hence, x¯T∇x(ξ¯T f )(x¯, y¯) = y¯T∇y(ξ¯T f )(x¯, y¯). Thus, (x¯, y¯, ξ¯ ) is feasible for (SP) and (SD) with
fi(x¯, y¯) – y¯T∇y(ξ¯T f )(x¯, y¯) = fi(x¯, y¯) – x¯T∇x(ξ¯T f )(x¯, y¯), i = , . . . ,p. Since (x¯, y¯, ξ¯ ) is feasible
for (SD), by weak duality in [], (f(x, y) – yT∇y(ξT f )(x, y), . . . , fp(x, y) – yT∇y(ξT f )(x, y)) 
(f(x¯, y¯)– y¯T∇y(ξ¯T f )(x¯, y¯), . . . , fp(x¯, y¯)– y¯T∇y(ξ¯T f )(x¯, y¯)) and (f(x¯, y¯)– x¯T∇x(ξ¯T f )(x¯, y¯), . . . , fp(x¯, y¯)–
x¯T∇x(ξ¯T f )(x¯, y¯))  (f(u, v) – uT∇u(ξT f )(u, v), . . . , fp(u, v) – uT∇u(ξT f )(u, v)) for any feasi-
ble (u, v, ξ ) of (SP) and (SD). Therefore, (x¯, y¯) is eﬃcient for (SP) with ﬁxed ξ¯ and (x¯, y¯) is
eﬃcient for (SD) with ﬁxed ξ¯ . 
Now, we give an example illustrating Theorems . and ..
Example . Let f(x, y) = x – y and f(x, y) = y – x. Consider the following vector opti-
mization problem (SP) together with its dual (SD) as follows:
(SP) Minimize (x – y + λy – λy, y – x + λy – λy)
subject to λy – λ  ,
x , λ = (λ,λ) ∈
o
S ,
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(SD) Maximize (u – v – λu + λu, v – u – λu + λu)
subject to λu – λ  ,
v , λ = (λ,λ) ∈
o
S .





 –x∇yfi(x, y)T –∇xfi(x, y)
–∇yfi(x, y)xT  ∇yfi(x, y)



















Let (x, y) ∈ R and (x*, y*, z*) ∈ S be a vector solution of the vector matrix game Bi(x, y),

































⇐⇒ there exist ξ > , ξ > , ξ + ξ =  such that
⎛
⎜⎝
x(yξ – ξ)y* – (xξ – ξ)z*
–x(yξ – ξ)x* – (yξ – ξ)z*










Thus, we determine the set of all the vector solutions of the vector matrix game Bi(x, y),
i = , .
(I) the case that x > :
(a) xξ – ξ > , yξ – ξ > : (x*, y*, z*) = (, , ).
(b) xξ – ξ > , yξ – ξ = : (x*, y*, z*) : {(,α,  – α) |  α  }.
(c) xξ – ξ > , yξ – ξ < : (x*, y*, z*) = (, , ).
(d) xξ – ξ = , yξ – ξ > : (x*, y*, z*) : {(α, ,  – α) |  α  }.
(e) xξ – ξ = , yξ – ξ = :
(x*, y*, z*) : {(x,x,x) | x  ,x  ,x  ,x + x + x = }.
(f ) xξ – ξ = , yξ – ξ < : (x*, y*, z*) = (, , ).
(g) xξ – ξ < , yξ – ξ > : (x*, y*, z*) = (, , ).
(h) xξ – ξ < , yξ – ξ = : (x*, y*, z*) : {(α,  – α, ) |  α  }.
(i) xξ – ξ < , yξ – ξ < : (x*, y*, z*) = (, , ).
(II) the case that x = :
(a) yξ – ξ > : (x*, y*, z*) : {( – α,α, ) | α  ξyξ , y > , ξ > , ξ > , ξ + ξ = }.
(b) yξ – ξ = : (x*, y*, z*) : {(α,  – α, ) |  α  }.
(c) yξ – ξ < : (x*, y*, z*) : {(α,  – α, ) |  α  }.
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(III) the case that x < :
(a) yξ – ξ > :





yξ – xξ – xyξ + xξ > , yξ – ξ > , xξ – ξ < , ξ > , ξ > , ξ + ξ = }.
(b) yξ – ξ = : (x*, y*, z*) : {(α,  – α, ) |  α  }.
(c) yξ – ξ < : (x*, y*, z*) = (, , ).
Let (x, y) ∈R and S(x,y) be the set of vector solutions of the vector matrix game Bi(x, y),





(α,  – α, ) |  α  }∪ {(,α,  – α) |  α  }
∪ {(α, ,  – α) |  α  }
∪ {(α,β ,γ ) | α  ,β  ,γ  ,α + β + γ = }
∪
{( yξ – ξ
yξ – xξ – xyξ + xξ
, – xξ – ξyξ – xξ – xyξ + xξ
,
– xyξ – xξyξ – xξ – xyξ + xξ
) ∣∣∣ x < , yξ – xξ – xyξ + xξ > ,
yξ – ξ > , xξ – ξ < , ξ > , ξ > , ξ + ξ = 
}
.
Let (x¯, y¯, ξ¯ ) be feasible for (SP) and (SD) with y¯∇y(ξ¯T f )(x¯, y¯) = x¯∇x(ξ¯T f )(x¯, y¯) = . We can
easily check that
{





















 + x¯ + y¯ ,
y¯
 + x¯ + y¯ ,









) ∣∣∣ ξ > , ξ > , ξ + ξ = 
}
⊂ S(x¯,y¯).
Therefore, Theorem . holds.
Let (x, y) ∈R and S(x,y) be the set of vector solutions of the vector matrix game Bi(x, y),





(α,  – α, ) |  α  }∪ {(,α,  – α) |  α  }
∪ {(α, ,  – α) |  α  }
∪ {(α,β ,γ ) | α  ,β  ,γ  ,α + β + γ = }
∪
{( yξ – ξ
yξ – xξ – xyξ + xξ
, – xξ – ξyξ – xξ – xyξ + xξ
,
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– xyξ – xξyξ – xξ – xyξ + xξ
) ∣∣∣ x < , yξ – xξ – xyξ + xξ > ,















) ∣∣∣ ξ > , ξ > , ξ +ξ = 
}
.
Let F be the set of all feasible solutions of (SP) and let G be the set of all feasible solutions
of (SD). Then we can check that {( ξξ ,
ξ
ξ , ξ, ξ) | ξ > , ξ > , ξ + ξ = } ⊂ F ∩ G and




ξ ) = (
ξ




ξ ) = . Therefore, Theorem . holds.
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